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W e study and compare decision-making behavior under the newsvendor and the two-class revenue managementmodels, in an experimental setting. We observe that, under both problems, decision makers deviate significantly
from normative benchmarks. Furthermore, revenue management decisions are consistently higher compared to the news-
vendor order quantities. In the face of increasing demand variability, revenue managers increase allocations; this behavior
is consistent with normative patterns when the ratio of the selling prices of the two customer segments is less than 1/2,
but is its exact opposite when this ratio is greater than 1/2. Newsvendors’ behavior with respect to changing demand var-
iability, on the other hand, is consistent with normative trends. We also observe that losses due to leftovers weigh more
in newsvendor decisions compared to the revenue management model; we argue that overage cost is more salient in the
newsvendor problem because it is perceived as a direct loss, and propose this as the driver of the differences in behavior
observed under the two problems.
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1. Introduction
The newsvendor model, which sets the order quantity
of a product with uncertain demand, is the base
model for inventory management, and has received
significant attention in the behavioral literature in the
past decade (see e.g., Bolton and Katok 2008, Schweit-
zer and Cachon 2000). The two-class revenue manage-
ment model, on the other hand, where the decision
maker allocates a fixed capacity between two cus-
tomer segments (low- and high-end), is the oldest
revenue management model still in use, and captures
the essential features of revenue management settings
such as finite supply of inventory, price differentia-
tion, a fixed sales horizon, and uncertain demand.
Under both problems, the decision maker tries to find
the quantity to order/allocate that would minimize
instances of unsold units and turned away (high-end)
customers (in the revenue management framework,
the low-end segment exists solely to compete on
capacity that would otherwise remain unsold). At the
normative, that is, expected earnings maximizing,
decision, the costs of ordering/allocating too many
units (overage), and too few units (underage) are
matched. In particular, when the problem parameters
are set accordingly, these two problems are mathe-
matically equivalent, that is, they yield the same
normative decision. However, there are behavioral
differences between the two problems. Newsvendors’
aim is to maximize profits, whereas in revenue man-
agement settings, earnings are stated in terms of reve-
nues, because typically fixed costs are high and
variable costs are negligible. The capacity constraint
is also missing in the newsvendor problem; the deci-
sion maker sets an order quantity, whereas the reve-
nue manager makes an allocation decision between
two customer segments.
In this paper, we study and compare decision-mak-
ing behavior in an experimental setting, under these
two base operations management models. Although
newsvendor and revenue management decisions
have been studied from a behavioral perspective
before (see below for a detailed review of the litera-
ture), we are not aware of any study that compares
decision making under the newsvendor and the two-
class revenue management models. Furthermore, the
previous behavioral work on revenue management
(Bearden et al. 2008, Bendoly , 2011, 2013) focuses on
a different problem than the one we consider, where
each customer has a different valuation for the
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product (while we focus on two customer segments)
and the firm can accept or reject a bid (unlike our
setting, where demand is refused only if there are no
remaining units for sale); our results complement
their findings on decision making in revenue manage-
ment settings. Revenue management applications are
mostly automated in areas such as transportation and
accommodation, where policies are implemented
over many instances. In other industries, with a few
large events per year, however, such as sports and
entertainment events management, or broadcasting,
there is room for individual decision making. For
example, “tour operator revenue management is
largely a manual operation, with analysts trawling
through text reports to see what capacity is selling
well and what is not, and manually implementing
price changes or barring holidays from sale in
response to this information” (Jarvis 2002). Since man-
agers responsible from revenue management applica-
tions are not necessarily trained in optimization
methods, we believe insights about actual revenue
management decision-making behavior would prove
valuable.
Our results might also provide behavioral research
directions about decision making under other, mathe-
matically equivalent but behaviorally distinctive,
operations management models. For example, Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004) argue allocating capacity and
managing prices are mathematically equivalent in the
revenue management context, because both limiting
supply and increasing prices can achieve reducing
sales. Similarly, for a manufacturer, offering quantity
discount schedules or a fixed fee plus single price con-
tract are normatively equivalent (Ho and Zhang
2008), but structurally different.
Our experimental studies show subjects’ decisions
deviate significantly from normative benchmarks
under both the newsvendor and the revenue manage-
ment problems. In fact, average decisions are signifi-
cantly lower than the normative levels when the ratio
of cost to price (or the low-end price to the high-end
price) is less than 1/2, and they are significantly
higher when this relationship is reversed. This behav-
ior is consistent with the findings in the behavioral
newsvendor literature.
Normative theory predicts, under equivalent price,
cost and demand parameters, newsvendors and reve-
nue managers would order/allocate the same
amount. However, we observe that, under the same
set of parameters, our revenue managers consistently
allocate more to the high-end segment compared to
newsvendor order decisions. Furthermore, from a
performance perspective, revenue managers are left
with significantly more unsold units compared to
newsvendors, while the amount of lost sales experi-
enced under the two problems is similar.
Our experimental design also allows us to study
the direction of the change in newsvendor and reve-
nue management decisions with respect to changing
demand variability. Demand factors have been
acknowledged as the major source of uncertainty in
many operations management models (Davis 1993),
and have a considerable impact on their results and
how operational processes are managed. We observe
that newsvendors’ behavior is consistent with norma-
tive trends; they order more in response to an increase
in demand variability when the ratio of cost to price is
less that 1/2, and display the opposite behavior when
this ratio is greater than 1/2. Revenue managers, on
the other hand, consistently allocate more to the high-
end segment as its demand gets more variable,
regardless of the ratio of prices; this pattern is the
opposite of normative behavior when the ratio of low-
end to high-end price is greater than 1/2.
As discussed above, although mathematically
equivalent, the newsvendor and the revenue manage-
ment problems differ structurally in terms of their
objective (profit vs. revenue maximization). This
difference is reflected in the costs of overage and
underage incurred under the two models. In particu-
lar, when newsvendors order too many units relative
to demand, they incur negative earnings (because
they have already paid for these units), whereas reve-
nue managers experience neither loss nor gain, since
variable costs are negligible. When sales are lost due
to ordering/allocating too few units relative to
demand, however, both revenue managers and
newsvendors experience foregone potential earnings
(in the amount of the unit margin). Prior research has
shown that the nature of losses incurred might impact
decision making (see e.g., Frederick et al. 2009, Ho
et al. 2010, and Thaler 1980) in the newsvendor con-
text, which suggests this difference in overage costs
might render minimizing instances of unsold units
more salient to newsvendors. This would explain the
behavioral patterns observed under the two prob-
lems; while trying to avoid overage, newsvendors
would end up ordering fewer units than revenue
managers’ allocations to the high-end segment.
Indeed, in our study, we observe that losses due to
leftovers weigh significantly more in newsvendor
orders compared to revenue management decisions.
Furthermore, newsvendors change decisions more
frequently and in greater amounts in response to
overage compared to revenue managers.
Literature review. There is a growing body of work
in the operations management literature which shows
that decision makers do not generally behave as pre-
scribed in analytical models. The seminal paper in
this stream is due to Schweitzer and Cachon (2000),
who study the newsvendor problem in an experimen-
tal setting, and establish the pull-to-center effect,
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which refers to the decision makers’ tendencies to
place orders between the normative order quantity
and the mean demand. The pull-to-center effect is
confirmed by Benzion et al. (2008), Bolton and Katok
(2008), and Bostian et al. (2008). Other experimental
works on the newsvendor problem have extended
Schweitzer and Cachon’s (2000) framework to study
the impact of feedback frequency (Lurie and Swami-
nathan 2009), group decision making (Gavirneni and
Xia 2009), impact of information (Gavirneni and Isen
2010), framing (Schultz et al. 2007), the relationship
between cognitive reflection and newsvendor deci-
sions (Moritz et al. 2013), loss aversion and source of
income (Becker-Peth et al. 2013), random errors in
ordering (Kremer et al. 2010), reference dependence
(Ho et al. 2010), and overconfidence (Ren and Croson
2013). Although most of the laboratory analysis of the
newsvendor problem has been done with students as
subjects, Bolton et al. (2012) show that experienced
managers’ behavior is very similar.
Bearden et al. (2008) provide an experimental study
of decision making in the revenue management con-
text, and consider different decision-making heuristics
that may be employed by the subjects. Bendoly (2011)
uses a set up similar to Bearden et al.’s (2008) to inves-
tigate the influence of arousal and stress, and forms of
feedback (2013) on revenue management decisions.
Additional work in the behavioral operations man-
agement literature includes studies on the supply
chain model (Katok et al. 2008, Loch and Wu 2008a),
particularly the causes of the bullwhip effect, that is,
the large variation in orders, particularly those placed
upstream, as a result of small changes in demand (see
Croson and Donohue 2002 for a review, also Bloom-
field et al. 2007, Croson , and Donohue 2003, 2006,
Katok and Wu 2009). For detailed reviews of the
behavioral operations management literature, the
reader is referred to Bendoly et al. (2006), Gino and
Pisano (2008), Loch and Wu (2008b), and Bendoly
et al. (2010).
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section outlines the normative news-
vendor and revenue management problems, the
details of our experimental design, and laboratory
implementation. Section 3 presents our experimental
results. Section 4 provides a summary and discussion
of our findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Analytical Background and
Experimental Design
2.1. Analytical Background
In the newsvendor problem (NV), a decision maker
facing uncertain demand D has to decide how many
units to order of a given product at cost per unit c, to
be sold at price p. In the standard two-class revenue
management model (RM), on the other hand, the deci-
sion maker determines the allocation of a fixed quan-
tity of a flexible resource between two customer
segments (class 1 and class 2) with sequential prices
(p1 and p2, with p1 > p2 without loss of generality),
and uncertain demands D1 and D2. In this setting,
class 2 demand arrives before class 1 demand, and the
decision maker sets the protection level, that is, the
number of units reserved for class 1; the remaining
units are available for sale to class 2. The objective is
profit maximization in the newsvendor model,
whereas in revenue management settings, earnings
are stated in terms of revenues. We denote the deci-
sion under both problems (i.e., order quantity in news-
vendor, and protection level in revenue management)
by x; both are set before the realization of demand(s).
The normative, that is, expected profit/revenue
maximizing, decision for both models solves
x ¼ F1 cU
cU þ cO
 
;
where cU is the cost of having too few units relative
to demand (underage), cO denotes the cost of having
too many units relative to demand (overage), and
F1 is the inverse of the cumulative distribution
function for the (class 1) demand (as noted previ-
ously, in the revenue management framework, class
2 exists solely to compete on capacity that would
otherwise remain unsold; hence the normative allo-
cation is not a function of its demand).
Under the newsvendor problem, the cost of being
left with unsold units is cO = c, since the decision
maker has already paid for these units, whereas the
cost of turning away customers is the profit per unit,
cU = pc. In the revenue management setting, if there
is overage, the decision maker is left with unused
capacity that cannot be offered to class 2 customers
again, because of the sequence of demand arrivals;
hence, the cost of having too many units relative to
demand is cO = p2. If actual class 1 demand exceeds
the protection level, on the other hand, units that
could have been sold to class 1 are sold to class 2
customers earlier in the sales horizon at a lower price,
leading to a cost of underage of cU = p1  p2. Remark
that, when D and D1 have the same probability
distribution, and p = p1 and c = p2, the revenue man-
agement and the newsvendor problems are mathe-
matically equivalent, that is, they yield the same
normative decision x ¼ F1 pcp
 
¼ F1 p1  p2p1
 
. For
more on the analytical solution to the newsvendor
and the two-class revenue management problems, the
reader is referred to Porteus (2002), respectively
Littlewood (1972).
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2.2. Experimental Design
We employed a 2 9 2 design in our experiments,
resulting in four distinct conditions. The first factor
distinguishing the conditions was the problem the
subjects were given (NV, RM), and the second was
the price and cost levels (high-cost, low-cost; dis-
cussed in detail below).
The subjects assigned to the newsvendor conditions
were asked to determine the order quantity for a
product with a predetermined unit cost and selling
price, to satisfy an uncertain demand with a given
distribution. Those who were assigned to the revenue
management conditions, on the other hand, were
asked to allocate 120 airline seats between two cus-
tomer segments with sequential price levels and
uncertain demands (this setting was chosen because
the airline industry is the major adopter of revenue
management practices). All subjects were required to
complete 40 experimental rounds.
There were two cost conditions in our studies.
Under the low-cost condition, the prices for the cus-
tomer segments were set at p1 = 120 and p1 = 30 for
the revenue management problem, and the selling
price was given as p = 120 and the unit cost as c = 30
for the newsvendor problem, to ensure their norma-
tive equivalence. Under the high-cost condition, on the
other hand, we had p = p1 = 120 and c = p2 = 90.
Remark that, under the high-cost condition, overage
is more detrimental to earnings (because of the higher
cost/class 2 price); underage hurts earnings more
under the low-cost condition (because the unit margin
pc = p1  p2 is higher).
The uncertain demands were distributed Uniform
under both models. We manipulated the demand dis-
tributions to investigate the impact of changing
demand variability on subject behavior (in the reve-
nue management conditions, only class 1 demand
was manipulated; class 2 demand remained constant
throughout the experimental rounds, and was distrib-
uted Uniform(50,170)). In particular, demand parame-
ters were changed in a manner that preserved the
mean, while changing the variance every 10 rounds.
To check for order effects, some subjects were given
parameters that corresponded to increasing demand
variability, while the rest faced decreasing demand
variability (order effects refer to the possibility that
subjects’ experiences in an experiment might bias
their decisions in following experiments; see for
example, Camerer 2003). The parameters of the spe-
cific demand distributions used, corresponding
means, variances, and normative decisions are given
in Table 1. Recall from above that, for both problems,
the normative decision is given by x ¼ F1 cUcUþcO
 
.
In particular, when demand is distributed Uniform
(a,b), x ¼ b cp ðb aÞ ¼ b p2p1 ðb aÞ. Note that, the
normative order quantity/protection level decreases
as the demand variability increases in the high-cost
condition; in order to avoid ending up with unsold
units, which hurts earnings more, and which now has
a higher probability because of the shift of the proba-
bility mass from the center to the tails, the decision
maker orders/sets aside fewer units. The opposite
behavior maximizes expected profits/revenues in the
low-cost condition; decision maker increases orders/
protection levels to avoid lost sales, as underage is
more detrimental to earnings in this case.
A total of 112 subjects participated in our study. No
subject participated in more than one condition. A
summary of our experimental conditions and the
number of subjects in each condition are given in
Figure 1.
Laboratory implementation. All experimental sessions
followed the same protocol. When the subjects
arrived at the experimental laboratory, they were
given instructions that described the newsvendor or
the airline revenue management problem (according
to the condition they were assigned to), their objec-
tive, the concepts of overage and underage, and the
experimental protocol. After all the subjects finished
reading the instructions on their own, the experi-
menter read them aloud, using PowerPoint slides to
illustrate concepts and examples, and answered ques-
tions. At the end of this training period, a short test
was administered to the subjects to ensure they
understood the instructions. Only the participants
who completed the test successfully began the experi-
mental rounds.
Table 1 Demand Treatments
Normative decision
Demand Mean Variance Low-cost High-cost
Uniform(0,80) 40 533.33 60 20
Uniform(10,70) 40 300 55 25
Uniform(20,60) 40 133.33 50 30
Uniform(30,50) 40 33.33 45 35
Figure 1 Summary of Experimental Conditions
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The experiments were conducted with specifically
programmed software based on the Visual Basic for
Applications (VBA) platform. At the beginning of
each round, subjects were provided with the demand
distribution, price, cost, and capacity information for
that round, based on the experimental condition they
were assigned to. After making their decision, they
learned the actual demand(s) for that round, as well
as realized profits/revenues, the number of unsold
units, and the number of turned away customers.
Demand realizations were determined prior to the
experiment, and were the same for every subject. An
information message was displayed on the screen
when there was a change in the problem parameters.
Subjects were briefed and dismissed after they com-
pleted 40 experimental rounds; they were not
informed of the total number of rounds prior to the
experiment. None of the subjects received information
about others’ performance and subjects were not
allowed to communicate with each other during the
experiment. Each session lasted approximately 90
minutes, including the training period and the pilot
rounds.
3. Results
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our subjects’
decisions, including the average and normative
decisions, and standard deviation between subjects.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a visual summary (histo-
grams of our subjects’ decisions are provided in
Figures A1–A8 in the Appendix).
For the majority of our analyses, we used the Wilco-
xon test (Siegel 1956) for the comparisons. We
checked our data for any order effects, that is, we
compared the average decisions of subjects who faced
demand treatments in the order of increasing variabil-
ity and those who faced the opposite demand
sequence under all experimental conditions, and
observed no significant differences (p > 0.15 for all
comparisons).
When we compared actual average decisions with
the normative benchmarks given in Table 2, we
observed significant differences under all experimen-
tal conditions and demand treatments considered
(p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). In fact, at the individ-
ual level, the number of times our subjects chose the
normative decision accounted for 5.79% of all revenue
management decisions, and 8.86% of all newsvendor
decisions. Further Wilcoxon tests revealed that, under
the low-cost condition, the average decisions were
significantly lower than the corresponding normative
levels under all demand treatments, while under the
high-cost condition, they were significantly higher
(p < 0.0001 for all comparisons).
3.1. Comparison of Decisions under NV and RM
A visual analysis of Figures 2 and 3 reveal that our
revenue managers’ average decisions were consis-
tently higher compared to our newsvendors. In par-
ticular, pairwise Wilcoxon tests revealed that, in the
low-cost condition, our revenue managers’ average
Figure 2 Subjects’ Average Decisions: Low-Cost Condition
Figure 3 Subjects’ Average Decisions: High-Cost Condition
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics
NV RM
Demand
Average
decision
Standard
deviation
(between
subjects)
Average
decision
Standard
deviation
(between
subjects)
Normative
decision
Low-cost (p = p1 = 120,c = p2 = 30)
Uniform(0,80) 41.41 7.21 49.06 7.03 60
Uniform(10,70) 40.94 6.12 44.24 5.61 55
Uniform(20,60) 40.13 4.86 41.07 3.82 50
Uniform(30,50) 39.40 1.71 39.96 2.67 45
High-cost (p = p1 = 120,c = p2 = 90)
Uniform(0,80) 33.42 8.60 43.15 7.97 20
Uniform(10,70) 35.83 6.16 39.99 6.09 25
Uniform(20,60) 35.85 4.95 38.56 3.51 30
Uniform(30,50) 38.11 2.67 38.46 2.35 35
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allocation decisions were significantly higher com-
pared to the average order quantity under NV when
demand was distributed Uniform(0,80) and Uniform
(10,70) (p < 0.0001 and p = 0.053, respectively),
whereas the difference between average revenue
management and newsvendor decisions was not sig-
nificant when demand was distributed Uniform(20,60)
and Uniform(30,50) (p > 0.5). The same pattern was
observed in the high-cost condition; the difference
between the average newsvendor orders and revenue
management allocations was significant when
demand was distributed Uniform(0,80) (p < 0.0001)
and Uniform(10,70) (p = 0.015), whereas average pro-
tection levels were not significantly higher when
demand was distributed Uniform(20,60) and Uniform
(30,50) (p = 0.092 and p = 0.931, respectively).
The tendency of revenue managers to set higher
decisions compared to newsvendors could also be
observed at the individual level (see Figures A1–A8
in the Appendix). For example, from Figure A1, in the
low-cost condition, when demand was distributed
Uniform(0,80), the majority of newsvendor decisions
(71.92%) were between the normative quantity
(x* = 60) and the mean demand (40); the percentage
of revenue management decisions which fell in this
range was 57.60%. In fact, allocation decisions under
RM were clustered around a higher range; 68.40% of
all revenue management decisions were between 50
and 70 in this case. Similarly, under the same demand
treatment in the high-cost condition (Figure A5),
79.06% of our revenue managers’ allocation decisions
were in the range [30,60], whereas newsvendor order
quantities tended to fall between 20 and 50 (77.59% of
all decisions). Similar patterns were observed under
the other demand treatments.
Revenue managers and newsvendors also dis-
played different behavioral patterns with respect to
changes in demand variability. Figure 4 provides a
visual summary. In particular, the change in the
direction of average revenue management and news-
vendor decisions were consistent with normative
predictions in the low-cost condition; they increased
in demand variability. In the high-cost condition,
our revenue managers’ average allocations again
increased as demand variability increased, while
average newsvendor order decisions decreased. As
outlined above, normative theory prescribes lower
decisions in response to higher demand variability in
this case. However, differences between average
decisions across demand treatments were not uni-
formly significant (individual p-values are given in
Table 3).
We conclude this subsection with the results from a
dummy-variable regression analysis that summarizes
the findings presented above, and provides an evalua-
tion of our subjects’ decisions from a performance per-
spective. In particular, we regressed the deviations of
the subjects’ decisions from normative benchmarks on
dummy variables representing the problem (NV or
RM) and the demand treatments, for both low- and
high-cost conditions. In all the regressions, we took the
revenue management problem and the demand treat-
ment Uniform(0,80) as the baseline cases. Our regres-
sion equation under the low-cost condition was thus
(x*  xij) = a + dP + ΣbkXk + e, and under the high-
cost condition it was (xij  x*) = a +dP + ΣbkXk + e,
where xij denotes the decision of the ith subject in
round j, and x* is the corresponding normative deci-
sion, with the coefficient of the variable P representing
the effect of the problem switching from RM to NV,
and the coefficients of X1, X2 and X3 indicating the
effects of demand treatment changing from the base
demand level of Uniform(0,80) to Uniform(10,70), Uni-
form(20,60) and Uniform(30,50), respectively. Table 4
presents the results from this analysis, which show
that, in the low-cost condition, decisions were closer to
the normative levels under the revenue management
problem compared to the newsvendor problem, while
this relationship was reversed in the high-cost
condition. Furthermore, the distance between subjects’
decisions and the normative benchmarks decreased as
demand variability got lower, under both cost condi-
tions.
Figure 4 Normative vs. Subjects’ Average Decisions with Respect to
Demand Variability
Table 3 p-Values for Comparisons with Respect to Demand Variability
Demand
Uniform
(0,80)
Uniform
(10,70)
Uniform
(20,60)
Uniform
(30,50)
NV High-cost 33.42<p = 0.018 35.83<p = 0.482 35.85<p = 0.007 38.11
Low-cost 41.41>p = 0.483 40.94>p = 0.137 40.13>p = 0.194 39.40
RM High-cost 43.15>p = 0.004 39.99>p = 0.103 38.56>p = 0.526 38.46
Low-cost 49.06>p = 0.001 44.24>p = 0.001 41.07>p = 0.031 39.96
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3.2. Comparison of Overage and Underage under
NV and RM
We also compared the amount of overage and under-
age experienced under the newsvendor and the
revenue management models. We conducted a
dummy-variable regression analysis, similar to the
one presented in the section above, to study the
impact of the problem the subjects were assigned to
(NV or RM) on the amount of lost sales and unsold
units. Specifically, our regression equation for
the amount of overage was (xij  dj) = a + dP
+ ΣbkXk + e, and similarly, for the amount of under-
age, (dj  xij) = a + dP + ΣbkXk + e, where xij denotes
the decision of the ith subject in round j, and dj is the
actual demand realization in round j, with the coeffi-
cient of the variable P representing the effect of the
problem switching from RM to NV on the amount of
overage/underage, and the coefficients of X1, X2
and X3 indicating the effects of demand treatment
changing from the base demand level of Uniform(0,80)
to Uniform(10,70), Uniform(20,60), and Uniform(30,50),
respectively. Results are presented in Table 5.
We found a significant effect of the problem on the
amount of overage experienced under both low- and
high-cost conditions. Specifically, the number of
unsold units decreased significantly when the prob-
lem switched from RM to NV. When we considered
the amount of underage, we observed that, under the
low-cost condition, the problem did not have a signifi-
cant effect. Under the high-cost condition, on the
other hand, there was a significant increase in the
amount of lost sales under the newsvendor problem.
It should also be noted that, in terms of the level of
demand uncertainty, our regression analysis desig-
nated a clear pattern; the amounts of overage and
underage reduced significantly as the demand vari-
ability decreased, which might be attributed to the set
of available decision alternatives being smaller under
demand treatments with lower variance.
We also calculated the average number of unsold
units and turned away customers under the two prob-
lems. In the low-cost condition, newsvendors were
left with, on average, 8.68 unsold units, compared to
10.75 under the revenue management problem
(p = 0.002); the corresponding figures were 6.29 and
8.30, respectively, in the high-cost condition
(p = 0.001). The average amount of lost sales, on the
other hand, was 6.11 under NV and 5.08 under RM in
the low-cost condition (p = 0.073). Under the high-
cost condition, newsvendors turned away, on aver-
age, 8.38 customers; the corresponding figure was
6.16 for revenue managers (p = 0.002) (the average
number of unsold units and turned away customers
under NV and RM at the demand treatment level is
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix).
3.3. The Impact of Cost of Overage
As discussed in the Introduction, the difference in
behavioral patterns observed under the newsvendor
and the revenue management problems, detailed
above, might be explained by overage being more
salient to newsvendors (as newsvendors incur nega-
tive earnings when they have unsold units, whereas
revenue managers experience neither loss nor gain).
To pursue this line of investigation, we calculated
the loss parameter , proposed for the newsvendor prob-
lem by Becker-Peth et al. (2013), for each subject. The
loss parameter, denoted by b, measures the weight
given to losses due to unsold units in decisions, and
can be found by solving x ¼ F1 cU=cU þ bcOð Þ;
where, recall, F1 denotes the inverse of the cumula-
tive distribution function for demand, cO the cost of
overage, cU the cost of underage, and x a given sub-
ject’s decision. If overage is more salient to newsven-
dors, we would expect them to attach a higher weight
to losses due to leftover units in their decisions, com-
pared to revenue managers. Indeed, this was the case
in our study. The average loss parameter under the
newsvendor problem was 5.2 under the low-cost con-
dition; the average weight given to losses due to left-
overs under the revenue management problem was
significantly lower, 3.92, in the same cost condition
Table 5 Regression Analysis: Amount of Overage and Underage
Overage Underage
Low-cost High-cost Low-cost High-cost
Problem: NV vs. RM 1.8* 1.7* 0.3 2.5**
Demand treatment
Uniform(10,70) vs.
Uniform(0,80)
12.4** 11.6** 4.4** 5.4**
Uniform(20,60) vs.
Uniform(0,80)
15.3** 12.6** 8.7** 9.76**
Uniform(30,50) vs.
Uniform(0,80)
22.8** 20.0** 13.9** 15.6**
Constant 30.0** 26.2** 20.7** 21.9**
N 1138 1176 823 1158
R2 32.9% 29.8% 22.1% 22.7%
*p < 0.02, **p < 0.001.
Table 4 Regression Analysis: Deviations from Normative Benchmarks
Deviations from normative
decisions
Low-cost High-cost
Problem: NV vs. RM 3.1** 4.2**
Demand treatment
Uniform(10,70) vs. Uniform(0,80) 2.4** 5.5**
Uniform(20,60) vs. Uniform(0,80) 5.4** 11.3**
Uniform(30,50) vs. Uniform(0,80) 9.5** 15.2**
Constant 13.3** 20.5**
N 2040 2440
R2 11% 23.8%
**p < 0.001.
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(p = 0.03). Under the high-cost condition, the corre-
sponding figures were 0.95 under NV and 0.55 under
RM (p < 0.001). The average loss parameters at the
demand treatment level are provided in Table 6.
Furthermore, our newsvendors showed a stronger
tendency to avoid instances of overage compared to
revenue managers. Specifically, when we analyzed
how our subjects adjusted decisions with respect to
the outcome of the previous round, we observed that,
newsvendors decreased decisions 81.94% of the time
in the next round when they ordered more than
demand in the previous round, under the high-cost
condition, and 84.77% of the time under the low-cost
condition; the corresponding percentages were
56.45% and 81.25%, respectively, for revenue manag-
ers. Furthermore, under the low-cost condition, in
21.44% of revenue management decisions, our sub-
jects did nothing when they allocated more than its
demand to the high-end class in the previous round;
the corresponding percentage for newsvendors was
much lower (5.77%). In the high-cost condition, the
percentage of repeat choice for revenue managers in
response to overage was again higher compared to
newsvendors (8.07% vs. 4.98%), but lower than the
corresponding percentages in the low-cost condition;
this might be attributed to unsold units being more
detrimental to earnings in this case. We also calcu-
lated the average amount of change in decisions with
respect to the previous round; compared to revenue
managers, newsvendors decreased orders in greater
magnitudes when they experienced leftovers in the
previous round under both cost conditions (8.71 units
in NV vs. 6.21 units in RM under the high-cost condi-
tion, p = 0.019; the corresponding figures were 7.84
and 7.22 units, respectively, under the low-cost condi-
tion, p = 0.522).
4. Summary of the Results and
Discussion
In this study, we studied how structural differences
between two normatively equivalent operations
management models impact actual decision-making
behavior. Specifically, we compared newsvendor
orders with allocation decisions under the two-class
revenue management framework in a controlled labo-
ratory setting.
We observed that, under both problems, our sub-
jects’ decisions deviated significantly from normative
benchmarks. In particular, when the ratio of cost to
price (or low-end price to high-end price) was less
than 1/2, our subjects ordered/allocated significantly
fewer units compared to the normative benchmark.
When this ratio was reversed, their decisions were
significantly higher than the normative level. This
result was consistent with the findings regarding the
newsvendor problem in the behavioral operations
management literature (e.g., Bolton and Katok 2008,
Bostian et al. 2008, Schweitzer and Cachon 2000).
Revenue management allocation decisions were
consistently higher than the newsvendor orders in
our study, under equivalent price, cost, and demand
parameters, despite normative theory predicting sub-
jects would order/allocate the same amount. It
should be noted, however, that this difference was
not significant when demand variability was low,
possibly because the set of alternatives available to
decision makers was smaller under these treatments
(since variability is a measure of how spread out or
closely clustered values are).
Revenue managers’ and newsvendors’ behavioral
patterns also differed in terms of how they adjusted
decisions with respect to changes in demand variabil-
ity. Specifically, when the ratio of cost to price was less
than 1/2, newsvendors increased orders as demand
became more variable. When this ratio was reversed,
they decreased orders as variability increased. This
behavior was consistent with normative predictions.
Revenue managers, on the other hand, increased
protection levels in the face of increasing demand
variability, regardless of the ratio of prices.
We also observed that, revenue managers consis-
tently experienced more overage compared to newsv-
endors. The amount of lost sales, on the other hand,
was similar under the two problems when the ratio of
cost to price (or low-end price to high-end price) was
less than 1/2. When this ratio was reversed, that is,
when leftovers hurt earnings more, however, news-
vendors’ decisions led to significantly higher amounts
of underage compared to revenue managers.
Further analysis on the decision-making behavior
under the two problems revealed losses from overage
weighed consistently more in newsvendor orders
compared to revenue management decisions. We
argue that this is due to the nature of overage cost
under the two problems: newsvendors incur negative
earnings, because they have already paid for the units
than remain unsold, whereas revenue managers expe-
rience neither loss nor gain. We also observed that,
when newsvendors ordered too many units relative
to demand in the previous round, they decreased
decisions more frequently, and in greater magnitudes,
compared to revenue managers.
Table 6 Average Weight of Losses from Overage
Demand
Low-cost High-cost
NV RM NV RM
Uniform(0,80) 5.02 3.02 0.99 0.40
Uniform(10,70) 4.71 3.94 0.79 0.59
Uniform(20,60) 5.93 3.90 1.05 0.57
Uniform(30,50) 5.14 4.81 0.84 0.63
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We posit that the driver of the behavioral patterns
observed in our study is the cost of excess inventory
being more salient in the newsvendor problem.
Because newsvendors are more averse to losses due
to leftovers, they try to avoid overage more, and end
up with order levels consistently lower than revenue
management allocation decisions. Consequently, they
are left with fewer unsold units; in fact, when left-
overs hurt earnings more, while trying to avoid over-
age, newsvendors fall short of demand consistently
more compared to revenue managers. Furthermore,
when there is an increase in the variability of demand,
newsvendors focus on the shift of probability mass
from the center to the lower tail when the ratio of cost
to price is greater than 1/2, that is, when overage
hurts earnings more, and decrease orders as variabil-
ity increases. Revenue managers, on the other hand,
focus on the shift of probability mass to the upper tail
regardless of the ratio of prices, because losses due to
unsold units are less salient to them, and always
increase allocations to the high-end segment in the
face of increasing demand variability.
Relation to literature. As discussed above, in our
experiments, under both the newsvendor and the rev-
enue management problems, we observed decision
makers ordering/allocating too few units compared
to the normative levels when the ratio of cost to price
(or low-end price to high-end price) was less than
1/2, and too many units compared to normative
benchmarks when this ratio was reversed. Ren and
Croson (2013) suggest this behavior can be caused by
overconfidence, in particular overprecision. Overpreci-
sion refers to the belief that own estimates are more
accurate than they actually are (Moore and Healy
2008), and can lead to the underestimation of the vari-
ance of the demand distribution. Although we did
not measure overconfidence levels of our decision
makers, based on Ren and Croson’s (2013) results, it
can be argued that they were overprecise. However,
we cannot propose overprecision as an explanation
for the differences in behavior observed under the two
problems. In our study, revenue management decisions
were consistently higher than newsvendor orders. This
pattern, alongside the definition of overprecision,
would suggest that revenue managers were more over-
precise compared to newsvendors when the ratio of
cost to price (or low-end price to high-end price) was
greater than 1/2, and newsvendors were more overpre-
cise when this ratio was reversed. However, the news-
vendor and revenue management models do not differ
behaviorally in a manner that would suggest the rela-
tionship between the overconfidence levels of decision
makers under the two problems would be reversed
from one cost condition to the other.
Ho et al. (2010) develop a behavioral model for
newsvendor decisions based on reference dependence
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Thaler 1985). They pro-
pose that preferences in the newsvendor context are
composed of (i) an intrinsic utility associated with
final profits, and (ii) a change utility defined with
respect to a reference point. In this study, we argue
that losses from overage weigh more in newsvendor
decisions compared to revenue managers, because
newsvendors incur a direct loss when they have left-
over units, whereas revenue managers experience
neither gain nor loss. An equivalent argument would
be the reference point for decision makers under both
problems being no profits/revenues (i.e., their earn-
ings position before they make their decisions). If this
is the case, when they have leftovers, newsvendors
would incur a psychological cost (because they devi-
ate from the reference point), whereas revenue man-
agers would not; this would lead the newsvendors to
set lower order quantities compared to revenue man-
agers’ allocation decisions.
Becker-Peth et al. (2013) propose a behavioral
model based on prospect theory and mental accounting
to explain newsvendor order decisions. Their model
accounts for the source of income (from sales to cus-
tomers or returns to the supplier), and distinguishes
between the upside (getting rid of underage) and
downside (getting rid of overage) potentials of news-
vendor orders. In our setting, both the newsvendor
and revenue management incomes come from sales
to customers; hence, the source of income cannot pro-
vide an explanation for the different decision patterns
observed under the two problems. They also propose
a loss parameter to formalize the aversion of decision
makers to losses from leftovers, which we use to show
that the cost of overage weighs more in newsvendor
decisions compared to revenue managers, as dis-
cussed above.
Finally, it should be noted that, in the newsvendor
setting, the impact of changing demand variability
has been studied by Lurie and Swaminathan (2009)
from a behavioral perspective. Specifically, they pro-
vide their subjects with high- and low-variance
demand distributions (Uniform(1,1000) and Uniform
(450,500), respectively), and find that, when the ratio
of cost to selling price is less than 1/2, order quanti-
ties are lower under the low-variance condition com-
pared to the high-variance condition. This result is
consistent with our findings. However, they do not
study order behavior when the ratio of cost to selling
price is greater than 1/2, or under other degrees of
demand variability, and do not provide an explana-
tion of the behavioral patterns observed.
5. Conclusion
Our results suggest decision makers do not perceive
and process the newsvendor and the two-class
Kocabiyikoglu, Gogus, and Gonul: Revenue Management vs. Newsvendor Decisions
758 Production and Operations Management 24(5), pp. 750–761, © 2014 Production and Operations Management Society
revenue management models as identical problems,
despite their normative equivalence. As mentioned in
the Introduction, our results might yield insights
about decision making in other mathematically equiv-
alent, but structurally different, operations manage-
ment models, such as allocating capacity vs.
managing prices, or setting the protection level vs. the
booking limit (i.e., the number of units available to
the low-end segment) in the revenue management
context. Clearly, further behavioral studies would be
needed to make specific conjectures.
The analysis presented in this study identifies the
perceived losses due to leftovers as the main driver of
the behavioral patterns observed under the revenue
management and the newsvendor problems. Ho et al.
(2010) show, biases in newsvendor decisions that are
driven by losses from overage and underage might be
reduced by making instances of unsold units and lost
sales more salient to subjects during the experiment.
It might be interesting to extend this research in their
spirit, and study whether the relationship between
newsvendor and revenue management decisions
would be preserved if losses due to unsold units are
made more salient to revenue managers.
In the revenue management framework, the low-
end segment exists to compete on capacity that would
otherwise remain unsold. However, our findings
show that decision makers are not able to reap the full
benefits of a revenue management system; they allo-
cate more units to the high-end segment (compared to
decision makers assigned to a mathematically equiva-
lent problem), and are left with unsold units, which
could have been sold to the low-end customers earlier
in the sales horizon. Our results also suggest in reve-
nue management applications where the price differ-
ence between customer segments is low, such as a
restaurant chain which offers discounts to loyalty
card owners, decision makers might be inclined to
reserve fewer units for the low-end customers in
times of high demand variability, while the opposite
behavior would be more beneficial to earnings.
Clearly, training and incentive mechanisms are
required to make managers aware of the biases identi-
fied in this study.
Table A1 Average Magnitude of Overage and Underage
Demand
Overage Underage
NV RM NV RM
Low-cost (p = p1 = 120, c = p2 = 30)
Uniform(0,80) 16.46 22.03 8.15 6.08
Uniform(10,70) 7.95 9.63 8.21 6.59
Uniform(20,60) 7.55 8.07 5.11 4.70
Uniform(30,50) 2.76 3.30 2.96 2.94
High-cost (p = p1 = 120, c = p2 = 90)
Uniform(0,80) 11.79 17.45 11.47 7.40
Uniform(10,70) 5.50 6.75 10.86 7.95
Uniform(20,60) 5.71 6.66 7.55 5.80
Uniform(30,50) 2.15 2.33 3.64 3.47
Appendix
Figure A1 Histogram of Subjects’ Decisions: Low-Cost Condition, Uni-
form(0,80)
Figure A2 Histogram of Subjects’ Decisions: Low-Cost Condition, Uni-
form(10,70)
Figure A3 Histogram of Subjects’ Decisions: Low-Cost Condition, Uni-
form(20,60)
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